

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 100136
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:JWTWINAM

APPROVED BY NEA:ADAY

NEA/ARN:DEREUTHER

S/S:MR. SEBASTIAN

-----032347Z 117521 /61

P 032304Z MAY 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

USINT BAGHDAD

S E C R E T STATE 100136

EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, XF

SUBJECT: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN AND
SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY WE SEND FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF
KING HUSSEIN'S APRIL 25 - 26 DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT
ADDING PARENTHETICALLY POINTS SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
KHADDAM HAD EARLIER MADE TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ON
SPECIFIC ISSUES LATER COVERED BY HUSSEIN.

2. -- THE APRIL 25-26 DISCUSSIONS OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND
SECRETARY VANCE WITH KING HUSSEIN COVERED THE MAJOR
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STATES TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PEACE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS.
PRESIDENT CARTER REITERATED HIS COMMITMENT TO MIDDLE EAST
PEACE AND TO A MAJOR U.S. EFFORT, AS WELL AS THE STRONG
SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR JORDAN. BOTH AGREED THAT

FAILURE AT GENEVA WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO PREPARE THE GROUND WITH CARE IN ORDER TO GO TO GENEVA WITH SOME CONFIDENCE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS WOULD BE ACHIEVED THERE.

-- THE PRESIDENT, LOOKING AHEAD TO THE END OF THE PRESENT PERIOD OF CONSULTATIONS, SAID THAT THEREAFTER HE ANTICIPATED ASKING SECRETARY VANCE TO MAKE ANOTHER TRIP TO THE AREA. IF IT APPEARED AT THAT TIME THAT POSSIBILITIES EXISTED FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS AT A GENEVA CONFERENCE, THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO BE VERY ACTIVE IN PREPARING FOR IT. KING HUSSEIN PUT STRONG EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING WHERE WE WERE TO GO AT GENEVA BEFORE A CONFERENCE WAS CONVENED. HE SAID THIS YEAR WOULD HAVE TO SEE SOMETHING ON GENEVA, HOWEVER, AND THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED ABOUT THE CHANCES AS A RESULT OF HIS VISIT.

-- ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, WE NOTED, AS WE HAVE WITH OTHER LEADERS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SETTLEMENT. KING HUSSEIN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NATURE OF PEACE WOULD HAVE TO BE AN ELEMENT IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS. (KHADDAM SAID THAT PEACE SHOULD START WITH THE END OF BELLIGERENCY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE A TURNING POINT. THE LONG YEARS OF CONFLICT HAD CREATED PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS BUT IF PEACE WAS ACHIEVED, "WE WOULD NOT GO TOWARDS WAR." THE END OF BELLIGERENCY WOULD BE A STARTING POINT. THERE WOULD BE GUARANTEES FOR EVERY

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-- ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION, THE KING REAFFIRMED HIS VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK, WITH THE POSSIBILITY LEFT OPEN FOR MINOR MODIFICATIONS IN THE 1967 LINES, AND FROM EAST JERUSALEM, WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE THAT ALL JERUSALEM WAS AN OPEN CITY. ON THE QUESTION OF DEMILITARIZATION AND OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE KING INDICATED THAT HE WAS OPEN-MINDED. (KHADDAM SAID THERE COULD BE NO SURRENDER OF ARAB LAND OCCUPIED IN 1967, INCLUDING IN JERUSALEM)

-- THE SUBJECT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH BY HUSSEIN. THE KING SAID HE SUPPORTED IT, BELIEVING THE PALESTINIANS OUGHT TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. FOR HIS PART, HE WAS PREPARED TO LIVE WITH A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE, A JORDANIAN-WEST BANK FEDERATION OR THE PRE-1967 UNITY. HE THOUGHT PALESTINIANS WOULD WANT SOME LINK WITH JORDAN.

THE WISHES OF THE PALESTINIANS COULD BE DETERMINED IN A PROCESS SUPERVISED BY SOME INTERNATIONAL GROUP. THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THAT WE DO NOT THINK IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SEEK TO DEFINE THE NATURE OF A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND OR ITS RELATIONSHIP TO JORDAN, WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

(KHADDAM HAD SAID THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE CONFLICT. IF IT WAS NOT SOLVED IT WOULD BE HARD TO IMAGINE ANY STABILITY IN THE AREA. THE PLO MUST GO TO GENEVA, HE SAID; UNLESS PALESTINIANS TOOK PART IN AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD NOT BE PERMANENT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION HE SAID THAT IF PLO REFUSED TO GO TO GENEVA THIS WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION. WHETHER SYRIA WOULD THEN GO WOULD BE DECIDED BY ASAD AT THE TIME. THERE MUST BE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ON PALESTINIAN TERRITORY WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF ALL
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/AFN:MCKING:PAW

APPROVED BY: NEA:ARDAY

S/S-O:RGAMBLE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0000

S E C R E T STATE 100136

EXDIS

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION ABU DHABI, DOHA, KUWAIT,
MANAMA, MUSCAT, BAGHDAD FROM STATE MAY 03:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 100136

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VANCE UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 03-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: JJWTWINAM
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
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Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Reference: n/a
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Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2652342
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN AND SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, US, XF, (HUSSEIN I)
To: ABU DHABI DOHA MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/22c8309b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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